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Article 2

THE SECURITIES LAWS-AFTER 40 YEARS:
A NEED FOR RETHINKING
Daniel J. McCauley, Jr.*
I. Introduction
As the sun sets on 40 years of federal "regulation" of the securities industry
and its markets, it is a time for rethinking. There is now a need for Congress
to make a thorough review, study and evaluation of the philosophy which underlies the federal securities laws, and, just as importantly, of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's regulatory, enforcement and administrative policies.'
Following the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,2 with its thrust
directed toward full and fair disclosure, the regulation of securities markets, then
principally the national securities exchanges, began with the formation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission through the enactment of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The principal purpose of this article is to reconsider
and propose changes in philosophy and emphasis with respect to the aforementioned acts and their administration.
The Commission, Congress and interested industry and legal groups
have accumulated "mountains of paper" dealing with the securities laws. Much
has been done as a basis for a thorough congressional reevaluation. Following
the report to President-Elect Kennedy by former SEC Commissioner James M.
Landis,4 there have been published several studies of the securities markets and
securities laws, some of them quite massive, including the so-called Special Study,'
the Ouer-the-CounterMarkets Study,6 the Wheat Report,' and the Institutional
Investor Study.8
* Formerly a Member, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and General Counsel,
Federal Trade Commission. B.S., LaSalle College, 1938; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania
Law School, 1941. Partner, Blank, Rome, Klaus & Comisky, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1 This article had hardly been completed when Representative John E. Moss (D-Calif.),
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, introduced H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., on March 1, 1973,
which is titled the "Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1973." Although it is possible
that other bills may be submitted later in the session, it is reported that Mr. Moss desires
to send H.R. 5050 to the Senate by the end of the year. SEC. REG. & LAw REP. No. 192, at
A-1, A-2 (Mar. 7, 1973) (see the full text and summary of H.R. 5050 at F-1 to F-14).
H.R. 5050 proposes many changes in the regulation of the securities industry. However, it does not treat with most of the matters discussed in this article.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1971) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act].
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1971) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act]. The Securities and
Exchange Commission is referred to herein as the "SEC" or the "Commission."
4
J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960) [hereinafter cited as the LANDIS REPORT]. Suggested remedies for problems at the SEC relating to
delay, costs and agency organization are discussed in the report. Id. at 45-48.
5 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1-5 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
6 Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS STUDY '(1966).
7 SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (1969)
[hereinafter cited as the WHEAT REPORT].
8 SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1-7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY].
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More recently, under the leadership of former Chairman William J. Casey,
the SEC has published, and doubtless will continue to publish for a time, a series
of reports by advisory committees and Commission staff task forces dealing with
particular aspects of the Commission's enforcement and administration of the
securities laws. Two such reports of major importance deal with enforcement
policies' and real estate."0 Additionally, the Commission has effected significant
administrative changes through its rule-making power, particularly the 140 series
of rules."
Despite all that has been written and the studies which have been conducted, the statutory "patch quilt" which has resulted from various SEC amendment programs has not accomplished the overriding objective of the securities
laws-the protection of public investors. The most recent example of these
glaring shortcomings is the Commission's legislative recommendations of 1967
through 1970 during which Congress, the Commission and the industry were
mired in a tug-of-war centered principally on mutual fund sales loads at precisely the same time that billions of dollars were lost by public investors in the
inadequately policed, runaway exchange and "hot issue" markets. 12 The hopedfor mutual fund commission savings would not compare in any measure with
the staggering losses which public investors suffered in the markets.
Neither the SEC's legislative recommendations nor 'the enactments of
Congress have been effective in solving the problems which brought on the
market collapse of 1962s; nor has the SEC or Congress effectively closed the
door against the "back-office crunch" and broker-dealer failures of 1970. The
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPC) will blunt the effect of such
failures, 4 but there is grave doubt that enough has been accomplished to stamp
out the root causes of such failures. The impetus for the latter should originate
with the Commission, but Congress must prod the SEC, if necessary.
Hopefully, this article will stimulate thought and action in the following
principal areas of securities regulation: disclosure philosophy, new issue distributions, markets, and enforcement and regulation. Concededly, others may
contend for priorities respecting other aspects of the securities laws and regula9 SEC, REPORT OF THE ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1972) [hereinafter cited as the ENFORCEMENT POLICIES REPORT].
10 SEC, REPORT OF THE REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COmrIITTEE TO THE SECURITIES AND

EXCHANGE COMIsuSSION '(1972).
11 No attempt is made in this article to review the merits of the 140 series of SEC Rules.
12 Between 1968 and 1970 the value of stocks traded on national securities exchanges fell
a total of $78.8 billion, from $759.5 billion to $680.7 billion SEC, THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL
REPORT app. table 5, at 221 (1971). The additional billions of dollars lost by investors in
the over-the-counter market have not been calculated.
13 During 1962 the value of shares traded on national securities exchanges fell $52 billion.
SEC, TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1963). The Special Study contains a report on
the May, 1962 market break, which it characterized as the largest Dow-Jones Industrials per
cent decline (27%) by year-end 1962 during post-World War II. SPECIAL STUDY, supra
note 5, pt. 4, at 815, 836. The new issue market was particularly hard hit, and the number
of new common stock offerings dropped from 273 in the first quarter to 99 in the third quarter
of 1962. Id. at 837. The report concludes in part: "The Special Study concludes . . . :
Neither the Study nor the NYSE has been able to ascertain the precipitating 'causes' on the
May 1962 market break." Id. at 862.
14 The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 aaa-111 (1970).
H.R. 5050, discussed supra note 1, deals with back office problems and contains proposed
remedies.
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tion. If they are stimulated to speak out, so much the better, for it can hardly
be disputed that it is now time to step back and look again at the securities laws
and their administration by the Commission and to see whether public investors
are being protected. Absent dramatically innovative action, public investors
again may suffer great financial losses unnecessarily through avoidable market or
securities industry collapses and market manipulations.
II. Disclosure Philosophy
The recognition by Congress of the compelling need to enact statutes regulating traffic in securities followed upon almost a century of business growth and
the expansion of frontiers which brought economic boom and bust, panic and
recovery, and head-butting of giants of business and finance which shook the
country to its foundations. Wall Street, the nerve center of America's financial
empires, saw in succession the rule of the railroad barons (e.g., the Vanderbilts,
Drews and Goulds), the amalgamators who were the heroes of monopoly and
merger (e.g., the Morgans, Cookes and Harrimans), the new industrialists (e.g.,
the Fords and Durants), and the market makers, all of whom made Wall Street
a "new Appian Way of the world.""5 Michael J. Meehan was a principal engineer
of the market activities in Radio, as Radio Corporation of America was known,
and was credited with pushing Radio up 500 points.'" Also, he was involved in,
and charged by the SEC with, an alleged manipulation of Bellanca Aircraft
Corporation stock in 1935.' Thereafter, he was expelled from all exchanges
of which he was a member,"g and thus proved to be the SEC's first big catch.
Against this background in the marketplace, and despite the generally
paternalistic pattern of state "blue sky laws,"' 9 Congress incorporated the full
disclosure concept in the 1933 Act. However, it did move in the direction of
regulation of securities markets in the 1934 Act.
Professor Loss succinctly summarized the history of the "idea of legislative
reform" in his remarks to the American Law Institute in May, 1969.0 The
15 E. SPARLING, MYSTERY MEN OF WALL STREET iX-XVii (1930). See also R. WARSHOW,
THE STORY OF WALL STREET (1929). Both books are fascinating histories of the growth of
Wall Street and the men who made it.
16 E. SPARLING, supra note 15, at 133-52. In summary, Radio jumped from 85 to 420
in 1928 and reached a split-share value of 570 in 1929 before the crash. There were technical
reasons for Radio's sensational rise. The bulk of the 1,155,400 shares of Radio was held by
General Electric, Westinghouse and other corporations and were never released for trading.
The floating supply available for trading was about 400,000 shares. As the stock started to
rise, an enormous short interest developed and apparently the "bulls" were buying stock
sold short by the "bears." This is the only possible basis to explain 300,000 and 500,000
share-days in a stock wherein only 400,000 shares were available for trading. At one point in
1928, up to 300,000 shares were sold short which precipitated a technical corner and drove
the stock up 61 points in 4 days.
17 In re Michael J. Meehan, 1 S.E.C. 238, 243 (1935).
18 In re Michael J. Meehan, 2 S.E.C. 588, 630 (1937).
19

See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 23 (2d ed. 1961).

20

Address by Louis Loss, American Law Institute Annual Meeting, May, 22, 1969, in

FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972), and in 25 Bus. LAWYER 27

(1969). The second tentative draft of the federal securities code will have been released at
the American Law Institute meeting in May, 1973. Professor Loss' Introductory Memorandum
to Tent. Draft No. 2 (1973) is reproduced at D-1 to D-5, SEc. REG. & LAw REP. No. 199
(April 25, 1973), and is summarized at A-2, A-3.
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1964 amendments to the securities laws21 brought on the first steps in merging
conceptually the reach of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Thereafter, Milton H. Cohen,
in his thoughtful, and provocative article, "Truth in Securities" Revisited,"
espoused the concept of a coordinated disclosure law which would give rise to a
constant disclosure system through continuous registrants. Professor Loss has
credited this article as the genesis of the events which resulted in the project to
codify the federal securities laws under the leadership of the American Law Institute.23
This author's comments respecting disclosure will hardly be accorded universal acceptance for they raise questions which have been brushed aside as
challenging the full disclosure concept. Additionally, they pose questions of
qualitative evaluation of companies and their securities. Certainly, they represent
a departure from the thinking of the securities experts who have labored through
the drafting of the ALI's proposed code. Milton Cohen titled his introductory
section "The Need for a New Look."' Since 1966, when the need was stated,
the progress has been labored. Principally, it has been the project of "concerned
citizens"; to be effective "the look" must be an in-depth review by Congress.
A. Does Every "Idea" Merit Public Financing?
The philosophy which underlies the 1933 Act encourages and permits the
public financing of any new idea or unseasoned business. This is a sharp departure from the practice in England where small companies, and more particularly
new ventures, are not attractive to investors. 5 Further, it has not been the
usual practice in England to finance a new business or discovery through a public
company. The government has, however, encouraged the formation of a bankfinanced corporation, the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation, to
provide capital for small and medium-sized companies. 2
The protection of investors and the avoidance of great losses to the public
would seem logically to support the view that there is a sensible middle ground
between the English and American extremes. It would be intolerable to muzzle
and frustrate the development of ideas. However, our system should provide
ways and means of safeguarding against unwarranted risk-taking by investors.
Consideration of such policies involves matters which are separate and apart
from controls of markets.
B. Expanded, Controlled, Small-issue Concept
Merely to use the word "controlled" will arouse a wall of animus in many
21

For a review of the 1964 amendments and their impact see T. MErER, Securities Acts

Amendments of 1964 (1964). The ALI-ABA has also prepared a summary of the amendments and the house committee report for use in connection with its course of study. ALI-

ABA,

REPRINT FROm FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW REPORTS

(1964).

22 Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HAzv. L. R. 1340 (1966).
23 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, xxxiii (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
24 Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, supra note 22, at 1340-44.
25 R. PENNrNOTON, CoMsANY LAW 190 (2d ed. 1967).
26 L. GowsR, TnE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 283, 284 '(3d ed. 1969).
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people. However, with patience, we may pursue this thought. At the outset, I
suggest as controls that (i) unseasoned companies and so-called idea companies
would be permitted to raise initially up to one million dollars and (ii) investors
be limited to sophisticated persons, funds or institutions sufficiently experienced
to assess the risks and financially able to suffer the possible losses. Assuming that
Congress continued the legislative policy stated in sections 18"T and 3 (a) (11 )28
of the 1933 Act, thus continuing the role of the states in securities regulation, it
follows that the intrastate exemption would continue to be legislative policy.
Congress might also apply the one-million-dollar ceiling to intrastate offerings
involving unseasoned companies and idea companies."
The other conditions, as well as the ceiling in amount, could apply to socalled Regulation A offerings pursuant to section 3(b) " of the 1933 Act. This
is not to say that other restrictive criteria should not be applicable to such offerings. On the other hand, congressional study might indicate a need that small
business be relatively unencumbered in raising up to $250,000. A balancing of
policy considerations in these areas and in dealing with unseasoned companies is
urgently needed.
The policies mentioned above would tend to develop bodies of securities
purchasers who are investors rather than speculators. There is need for legislative
study of these concepts to evaluate the merits and possible demerits of such
restraints. Needless to say, other conditions could also preclude aggressive
market-making by restricting salability and transferability of the securities of
such companies, possibly along the lines being considered in proposed Section
227(b) of the tentative draft of the FederalSecurities Code."
Additional restraints should be considered, such as:
1. requiring that the initial public investors receive at least 50 per cent
of the equity or the convertible right thereto;
2. eliminating so-called "cheap stock" by requiring promoters to invest
cash on a basis equal to public investors or to limit insiders to a small
percentage of the equity (eg., 10 per cent) if they exchange services or
the right to an idea for equity;
3. requiring that public investors as a group have a minimum representation on the board of directors (e.g., at least two directors or not less than
40 per cent of the directors) ; and
27 15 U.S.C. § 77 r (1970).
28 15 U.S.C. § 77 c (a)(11) (1970).
29 There is no limitation at the present time on the amount which may be raised in an
intrastate offering. If unseasoned companies offering intrastate were limited to one million
dollars, it would permit further reconsideration of the very restrictive limitations which exist.
Cf. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, § 301, Comment (4) on Exemptions Generally. Id. at 74-76.
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
30 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) '(1970). This section raised the small issue exemption to $500,000
from $300,000.
31 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 227(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). Section 227(b) deals
with limited offerings to institutions and not more than 35 other persons and restricts resales
so that for three years there are no more than 35 owners.
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4. restricting the expenses of such an offering, including compensation
to finders.
On the other hand, management effort and ingenuity could be encouraged by
liberal stock option plans which would be pegged, however, to fair value.
The foregoing types of conditions, as well as others which might be considered, would have as their purpose fairness to investors, while permitting, at
the same time, the financing of unseasoned companies or ideas.
C. Controls on Other Public Companies
Some types of restrictions such as those mentioned above should also be
applied to seasoned companies seeking public investors or as to which insiders
are selling their own shares to the public. The fairness of the price paid by the
public for the percentage of ownership sold by the insiders is crucial to investor
protection. In England a stock exchange quotation is crucial to a successful
public offering. 2 To invest one entity with such power, whether a governmental
agency or an industry group, would probably meet vocal opposition here. On
the other hand, it cannot be controverted that our present system does not produce the best results. Over the years, underwriters have not displayed a generally
acceptable capacity to balance fairly the price and the percentage of ownership
sold to the public. The need for establishing criteria and developing workable
formulae is a project which should have priority. Since such factors insert an
element of control and are a departure from disclosure alone, the public's need
for such controls requires financial and economic justification. It is believed
with confidence that the justification can be found. Philosophically, the concept
that the door to the public purse is a privilege requiring fair dealing and is not
solely a matter of right, limited only by full disclosure, can also be justified. Certainly no one prefers unbridled, bureaucratic controls, but criteria, in the form
of controls, could be woven into the statute as expressions of public policy.
D. Offering Documents
Of course, the concept of full disclosure must continue as a part of the
statutory scheme. But, how full is full? Periodically, the Commission speaks out
in favor of more readable, less verbose prospectuses. Unfortunately, as may be
said, this goal is like the weather--everyone talks about it, but no one does anything about it. Regulation A offering circulars, as well as prospectuses, can
readily be substantially reduced in size and written more clearly and understandably. The main avenue leading to these objectives is exploitation and adoption of Milton Cohen's continuous registration concepts. The Landis Report
also commented along these lines:
Much of the delay that attends the registration of securities could be eliminated by providing for simpler forms of registration and a simplified
32 R.

PENNINGTON, supra note 25, at 595-605.
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supervision of the process of registration with respect to seasoned securities,
bonds and debentures with an A or B rating and preferred stocks that for
a past period have shown an appropriate ratio of earnings to dividends payable on such stocks. In the case of seasoned securities of this nature, the
issuer and underwriter should be relied on to furnish full and accurate
statements of fact and deficiency letters could be substantially abolished. It
could also relieve from registration requirements certain admittedly technical public offerings for which registration is now technically necessary.
The necessity for maintaining a currently effective registration statement on
convertible securities, options and warrants, when an adequate market
exists for the basic securities and adequate information is available in annual
financial reports or proxy statements, is an example of a situation where
registration is unnecessary. The issuance of restricted options to groups of
employees not too excessive in number is another such example. More of
them can be found. Relieving the Commission and the industry of the necessity for acting on registration statements in such situations would clear the
Commission's
docket to some degree and relieve the industry of unnecessary
33
costs.

Despite all that has been written, the need for change continues. Prospectuses are
dull, formalistic, lengthy, and prolix documents which defy the average investor's
patience to wade through to the end.
E. Venture CapitalPools
As a compensating factor, in view of the controls heretofore mentioned, encouragement of the formation of pools of venture capital, raised through investment by sophisticated investors, should be considered.
III. New Issue Distributions
It is when new issues of securities of unseasoned and idea companies become
"hot issues," with the violent, meteoric price rises which occur, that public investors are subjected to great risk. It is not uncommon in such a market for the
stock of a company originally sold at, for example, $10 per share, to double or
come close to doubling the day it is offered, or within a short time thereafter.
Later, such stock prices may rise 500 per cent or more, without any material
change in the business of the company. In a situation familiar to this author, the
issuer's stock reached over $60 per share from an issue price of $10, notwithstanding that the company, which was really only an idea, had not executed its
first contract to sell its idea, a form of service. The company's stock is now selling
in the range of $8.00 per share. Imagine the money lost by public investors who
purchased the stock on the way up to $60, and others who bought in, all the way
down. True, some public investors profited, but the extent of the unnecessary
losses is the problem to be solved. Similar case histories have been repeated
thousands of times over the past 40 years.
The first real effort by the SEC to investigate the causes and effects of "hot
issue" markets originated October 20, 1971, with public hearings beginning in
33

LAINDIS REPORT,

supra note 4, at 45.
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February, 1972.' Several proposals resulted from this study,3s but at this writing
none of them has been adopted. In his introduction to the Commission's latest
Annual Report, former Chairman Casey summarized the proposals in relation to
(a) the roles of issuers, underwriters, and market makers, (b) discussions in
prospectuses relating to business plans, budget projections, plans for use of
proceeds, analysis of expected markets and (c) meaningless prospectus language
and better organization and presentation of information. 6
There is hardly any economic statistical information regarding the periodic
"hot issue" markets which the SEC has characterized as "disorderly" and which
cause "damage to public investors.1 3 There was no such public record developed
in the Commission's hot issue hearings so that there are no reliable statistics to
show the great economic impact and losses resulting from the gyrations of such
markets. If Congress conducts such studies, there will be abundant evidentiary
support for the need for a new dramatic approach to securities regulation.
Hot issue markets may develop in seasoned companies as well as in unseasoned or idea companies. Therefore, in addition to the proposals heretofore
made respecting such latter types of companies, the following additional market
controls should be considered:
1. To avoid the exploitation of "hot issue fever" to the disadvantage of
issuers and public investors, Congress should consider adopting the
English allotment system. 3 For example, if there is an offering of
500,000 shares and bona fide subscriptions for 1,000,000 shares, each
subscriber would receive one-half of the shares for which he subscribed.
This would tend to eliminate underwriter control over subscriptions,
which in the United States result in high, same-day profits benefiting
34

SEC,

THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT

11-12 (1972); see also SEC Securities Act

Release No. 5274 (July 26, 1972).
35 SEC, supra note 34, at 11-12; see also SEC Securities Act Releases Nos. 5274-5279
the Commission's continuing efforts
'(July 26, 1972). Release No. 5279 mentions again ....
to improve the readability of prospectuses ..
36 SEC, supra note 34, at xcxv.
37 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5274 (July 26, 1972).
This writer has examined the New Issue Outlook's May 5, 1969 computer report of over
400 recent issues and its report of a year later, May 4, 1970, of over 400 other recent issues.
As of May 5, 1969, the 25 stocks showing the largest gains from their offering prices
ranged from a gain of 160% for no. 25 to 1220% for no. 1. At the same time, the 25 stocks
showing the largest losses from their offering prices ranged from a loss of 38% for nos. 20 to
25 to 695 for no. 1.
The ranges a year later on May 4, 1970, were strikingly different. Nos. 24 and 25 showing
largest gains from offering prices were 25% higher while no. 1 was 233% higher. At the same
time, nos. 23 to 25 showing largest losses from offering were at 70% loss while no. I showed
an 83%1 loss.
The New Issue Outlook also reported gains and losses on a weekly basis. Merely to scan
these reports amply supports the inevitable conclusion that public investors are literally, not
figuratively, throwing their money away. The federal and state regulatory agencies are just not
doing the job.
38 For a detailed discussion of the English allotment procedure where an issue is oversubscribed see Knauss, Securities Regulation in the United Kingdom: A Comparison with
United States Practice, 5 VAND. J. TRANSN. L. 47, 58-60 (1971). This article is the most
comprehensive comparison in the literature of securities regulation in England and the United
States. It is indispensable reading for anyone considering and studying major shifts in policy
of the federal securities laws.

1100

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June, 1973]

underwriters and their friends, rather than the issuing company and the
investing public.
2. Consideration should be given to a moratorium on trading until a
fixed period after the distribution of share certificates or of such other
indicia of ownership as may be used in the future. Such a moratorium
would tend to assure that trading is between real owners in their sole
interests, rather than for the advantage of underwriters and their friends,
market makers and even short sellers.
3. Short selling of new issues by speculating broker-dealers should be
prohibited. There is no economic study yet which shows the losses
caused public investors by short sellers or the profits made by such
gamblers. The SEC is well behind the industry in recognizing this
evil. However, neither the SEC nor the industry has really done
anything about it. The short sellers damage the new issue market during
periods of "cold" rather than "hot" investor appetite. In such markets
the short sellers cause unnecessary damage to investors through their
artificial maneuvering of the market. Industry self-regulation has failed
miserably in this area. Unfortunately, the Commission's hot issue inquiry apparently failed to focus on this problem. It would seem to be
one problem which may be solved quickly since it is within the reach
of the existing statutory pattern.
IV. Markets
In his first public statement following his confirmation by the Senate, after
having been nominated by the President as Chairman of the SEC to succeed Mr.
Casey, G. Bradford Cook forecast a two-year (from February, 1973) timetable
for developing a central market system in which the SEC and the exchanges must
establish new regulatory machinery to govern the central market."9
There is a difference of opinion on the structure of such a market. One
outspoken critic of the apparent limitations being encrusted on the concept is
Donald E. Weeden. 0 In the main, he favors a consolidated tape, a common
quotation system, and the elimination of economic barriers, the two most signifi-

39 The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1973, at 5. Chairman Cook defined the system as
an expanded communications network linking all of the major stock markets-a composite
quotation system that will display bid and asked prices on securities being traded, thereby
allowing brokers to compete for the best prices available. See also, Address by Chairman Cook,
New York Financial Writers Ass'n, in SEc. REC. & LAw REP. No. 194, at H-i to H-3 (March
21, 1973); cf. SEC, supra note 34, at xxii-xxv (remarks of William J. Casey).
On March 29, 1973, the POLICY STATEMENT OF THE SECURITIES AND ExcxANGP CoMiMISSION ON THE STRUCTURE OF A CENTRAL MARKE-T SYssis was issued: SEC. REG. & LAW
RPP. No. 196 at D-1 to D-14 (April 4, 1973). Since the Commission characterizes its 68 page,
71 footnote opus as a ". . . guide for future structural development of the securities
markets .. . ," it appears that the industry and the Commission are likely to devote much time
and energy to this matter.
40 Chairman of the Board, Weeden & Co.; member, New York Stock Exchange.
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cant of which
are fixed commission rates and limited access by all brokers to all
41
markets.
The New York Stock Exchange's position has been stated by its Chairman,
James J. Needham, a former SEC Commissioner. Mr. Needham and Mr.
Weeden are poles apart, the Commission's Advisory Committee is divided, and
since Mr. Needham proposes a system which orbits around existing exchanges it
is unlikely that Mr. Weeden would characterize the system as a "radical
42

change."2

The question of such a central market, having been raised, requires congressional study and action. However, this author would not assign it as high a
priority as apparently the Commission does. Billions of dollars are being "filched"
from public investor while the industry and the Commission are having brokerdealers chasing around for fractions of points. True, the market can be made to
function more effectively and efficiently in this electronic age. However, there
are market activities well known to the industry, but not known to the Commission, which should have a higher priority of scrutiny and attention. Just ask some
knowledgeable over-the-counter market makers how the public could be better
protected in the operations of NASDAQ. Ask them how the shopping of 100
share lots, where there is a block of 2000 shares to be traded, can have the
domino effect of triggering successive price quotation reductions and wipe points
off the value of shares in the hands of the public. The question of the role of
over-the-counter specialists or market makers must be reconsidered. Before a
central system is set in motion all segments-the industry, the public and the
Commission-should correct the weaknesses, and even evils, which have already
developed in the electronic over-the-counter market. Doubtless, also, the central
market most likely to function in the public interest is somewhere between the
extremes at which Messrs. Needham and Weeden find themselves. There are
strengths and weaknesses in both positions. It is for the Commission and the
Congress to chart the best course, and, it is urged, the best course can only be
charted following aggressive investigative cross-examination to uncover the abuses
which have already surfaced. In this area of its power the Commission performs
regulatory functions and its full disclosure philosophical approach is inadequate.
41

Weeden, A Stock Trading System for the Future, The Financial Times of London, Dec.

5, 1972. In this article, Mr. Weeden stated:

Competing markets and market makers hooked into a nationwide communications
system reporting transactions and quotations equals a central market. There is no
place, de jure or de facto, in such a system for monopoly privileges....
There is no need--certainly not any public need-to limit competition in
market making. There is also no need to restrict, artificially, trading in any security
only to exchange markets. The New York Stock Exchange recently endorsed the
central market approach, but tried to restrict it to stock exchanges only, thereby
excluding all non-member dealers who wished to make markets. They were like
the maiden willing to be only a little bit pregnant. The clear fact is that the technology necessary to connect New York and Regional Exchange markets for the

operation of a central market system is identical to that necessary to connect the
New York, Regionals, and the Third Market.

Id. (emphasis in original).

42 Address by James J. Needham, Investor Conference at The New School of Social

Research, Jan. 27, 1973; ef.
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Effective regulation based on factual understanding of the problems is the better
course.
V. Regulation and Enforcement
For many years both regulation and enforcement were wed in a marriage of
questionable administrative validity in the Commission's Division of Trading
and Markets. In 1966 the Commission reported its "increased emphasis . .. to
improve the effectiveness of regulation and at the same time to reduce the burdens
of compliance." 43 It was not until August 7, 1972, that a separate Division of
Market Regulation was established by the Commission, in the words of former
Chairman Casey: ".. . to serve notice not only on a violator but on the entire
investment community as to the standards to which they will be held."" Chairman Casey pointed out the separate roles of regulation and enforcement and
asserted that both are essential since enforcement operates after the laws are
violated, while regulation operates at an earlier point in time, before violations
occur.
Chairman Casey also commented that a Branch of Trading Practices would
be established in the Division of Market Regulation and
... be charged with carrying on an educational program as well as developing regulations and providing interpretations and releases with a view to
and minimizing unwitting violations of secuelevating professional standards
45
rities laws and regulations.

The foregoing statement of policy is to be applauded. It is well that the
Commission at long last is moving away from a long-existing posture wherein
enforcement proceedings, in the courts as well as in SEC administrative proceedings, were a major vehicle to effect regulation. Since former SEC Chairman
Cook was the first director of the Division of Market Regulation a new emphasis
and thrust were to be anticipated in the future. Hopefully, the new Chairman will
champion such emphasis.
Commenting on the situation which he observed in 1960-that important
regulation by the Commission had been long delayed-Commissioner Landis
stated:
One serious feature of delay on the part of the Securities and Exchange
Commission lies in the issuance of regulations and forms. Important regulations have been delayed for years. Some reason for this delay lies in the inherent complexities of the problems and the commendable practice of the
Securities and Exchange Commission . . . of affording opportunities to the
industry to comment on proposed regulations. But an element of delay
arises from the incapacity of the Commissioners themselves to grasp the
essence of these problems and the significance of their resolution to the
financial community. Because of the excellence of its staff and the inherent
complexities of the problems, the Commission in a sense is the captive of its
43
44
(Aug.
45

SEC, THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1966).
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5287 (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9713)
1, 1972). This involved a major realignment of staff functions Commission-wide.
Id.
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staff. It appears to be incapable at times of resolving differences within the
staff and the resultant inaction makes for delay."
It is in the light of these comments respecting regulation and the Commissionstaff relationship that enforcement and regulation will be revisited.
A. Enforcement Policies
The Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and
Practices opens with a summary of 43 recommendations,"' few of which have
yet been implemented. "" Recommendation 10 states that "[t]he Commission
should give continuing attention to the conduct of investigations," and in numbers 1 and 11 it is recommended that a "planning office," to perform a
"staff" rather than a "line" function, be established under the direction of an
experienced official responsible to the Commission, not as an "ombudsman" but
rather as one making an appraisal of "....

whether the Commission's policy of

fairness, promptness and efficiency in investigative procedures is being observed." 9 The essential weakness of this suggestion is that it does not correct, but
rather continues, an unfortunate situation alluded to in another context in the
aforementioned Landis Report. Rather than a Commission enforcement policy,
over the past quarter-century at least, realistically, enforcement policy has been
staff-dominated.
Enforcement policy will become a Commission policy only when one or
more Commissioners devotes a major portion of time to directing staff action and
attitude. And, this will not occur until the members of the Commission are unshackled from the administrative burdens, some of which are trivia, in which the
Commission has been immersed and unable to relieve itself. The interposition
of another layer of staff, as suggested by the Advisory Committee, would merely
make more difficult the accomplishment of an enforcement policy truly reflecting
Commission direction and leadership-a policy which would flow downstream
rather than upstream, as it has for so many years. Perhaps, under the present
statutory framework it is impossible for the Commission so to free itself. It may
be that another approach is not only indicated, but necessary.
Since the 1930's the securities industry has lived under the jurisprudential
anomaly that the enforcement decision-maker (i.e., the Commission) has been at
the same time the judicial decision-maker-the adjudicative body which applies
the law to the facts, and sanctions those found guilty of violating the law.
Throughout this 40-year span, many concerned lawyers, experienced in the administrative law specialties, have been outspoken in criticizing administrative
agencies which have acted simultaneously as enforcer-prosecutor on the one
hand, and as judge and jury on the other. The Commission continues to be
46
47
48
(Sept.
49

LANDIs REPORT, supra note 4, at 46, 47 (emphasis added).
ENFORCEMENT POLICIEs REPORT, supra note 9, at i-viii.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5310 (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9796)
27, 1972).
ENFORCEMENT POLIcIEs REPORT, supra note 9, at iil, 24.
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concerned about this dual function of apparently conflicting positions.50 The
interposition of a hearing examiner, now an administrative law judge, did not
allay the fears of such lawyers. Perhaps there is a better answer. It is submitted
that it would be better jurisprudence to limit the Commission's functions so that a
Commissioner acts either as prosecutor or as judge. This could be accomplished
without adversely affecting the administration of the securities laws. The solution is a matter for congressional decision, after considering the contending sides.
For sure, however, the present statutory scheme should be changed and the Commission should be either prosecutor or judge, but not both.
Perhaps the concept of staff enforcement, with the Commission acting
solely in an adjudicative capacity, would be preferred by some. Under such a
system, the Director of the Commission's Division of Enforcement could be empowered to initiate administrative proceedings while the Commission's General
Counsel could be empowered to institute enforcement proceedings in court.5 ' The
role of Commissioners in the enforcement area would be purely adjudicative.
Others would prefer that all enforcement proceedings be initiated by the five-man
Commission and that the administrative law judges be truly independent members of a separate administrative court in which the judges would hear cases arising in all of the administrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission
and the Interstate Commerce Commission. Appeals from decisions of the judges
of such an administrative court would then be directly to the federal courts of
appeals and not to the Commission.
This author prefers the latter jurisprudential philosophy because it would
center in the five-man Commission administrative responsibility for securities
regulation, including rule-making, as well as enforcement. It would avoid
centralization of enforcement power in one man-either the Division Director or
General Counsel-and it would permit the development of true Commission
enforcement policies, not one-man enforcement policy. At the same time, judicial
objectivity would be accomplished, particularly in the application of sanctions
and penalties. Traditionally, the imposition of sanctions has been a judicial
function and, in the administration of the securities laws, it would be well to
retreat from the experiments initiated in the 1930's and acknowledge that the
time-honored jurisprudential methods are preferred. Congress would have to
establish an administrative court and relieve independent agencies such as the
SEC from such adjudicative responsibilities. Past SEC Commissioners should be
among the vanguard of those favoring such changes, for, almost to a man, they

50

The Commission has stated:
[The Commission is not in a position to, in effect, adjudicate issues of fact before
the proceeding has been commenced and the evidence is placed in the record. In
addition, where a proposed administrative proceeding is involved, the Commission
wishes to avoid the possible danger of apparent prejudgment involved in considering
conflicting contentions, especially as to factual matters, before the case comes to
the Commission for decision.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5310 '(Sept. 27, 1972).
51 Cf. the authority given to the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
a Presidential appointee, to investigate charges and issue complaints. Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d
217 (8th Cir. 1970); UAW v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1330 (6th Cir. 1970).
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have defaulted to the Opinion Writing Office in the articulation of policies."2
Very few Commissioners can claim to have reviewed the records in cases decided
during their terms. Such a review is central to the judicial function in appellate
matters.
During the past quarter-century very few Commissioners have had enforcement experience, and it is not unfair to state that very few Commissioners had any
real interest in the theory, techniques and objectives of enforcement. If Congress
relieves the Commission from performing adjudicative functions, then persons
with a knowledge of industry problems or with enforcement or regulatory experience would be prime candidates for appointment to the Commission.
B. Self-Regulation by the Industry
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the independent
industry body which is charged with regulating the over-the-counter markets and
the broker-dealers engaged therein, was formed following the Maloney Act
Amendments in 1938 to the 1934 Act.2 The NASD has adopted rules of fair
practice which, in article III, relate to business conduct and fair dealing with
customers and others.5 4 Also, it has adopted a code of procedure for handling
trade practice complaints. s
The National Securities Exchanges also have adopted rules and enforcement
procedures, typical of which are those of the New York Stock Exchange." The
Commission has only infrequently instituted enforcement proceedings against
Exchange member firms following disciplinary action by an exchange. One such
case is In the matter of Cady, Roberts & Ca. Duplication of enforcement
activity should not be a major objective. As pointed out by the Enforcement
Advisory Committee, there is a present, critical need for coordination between the
Commission, states, and self-regulatory agencies, the NASD and exchanges.'
If Congress restructures the Commission's enforcement role, at the same time
it should empower the Commission to exercise greater oversight over the NASD
and exchanges. The industry groups have a place and they can regulate industry
fair practices. Enforcement and discipline in public matters present problems of
52 LANDis REPORT, supra note 4, at 47. In commenting on Commission practice in
opinion writing, Mr. Landis stated:
The Securities and Exchange Commission has an opinion writing section whose
quality is high, if not the highest among the agencies. Nevertheless, it should be
abolished and individual Commissioners held individually responsible for the enunciation of the grounds upon which conclusions of the Commission are stated to rest.
If the numerous speeches and articles of the various Commissioners are a test of
their capacity for articulation, this should not be an impossible task.
Id. While this author was a member of the Commission with Chairman Edward N. Gadsby,
Byron D. Woodside and Earl Hastings, the assignment of cases to individual Commissioners
was initiated. It was abandoned, however, in 1961 under a new chairman appointed by President Kennedy.
53 15 US.C. § 780-3 (1970). For a full discussion of such amendments see I L. Loss,
supra note 19, at 1359-91.
54 NASD MANUAL %2151-80 (1971).
55 Id. If 3001-26.
56 2 N.Y. STX. ExcH. GumE, 1 1651-75 '(1971). See also I L. Loss, supra note 19, at
1168-83 for a discussion of Exchange discipline and rules.
57 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668 (Nov. 8, 1961), 40 SEC 907.
58 ENFORCEMENT PoLomIs REPORT, supra note 9, at 52-61.
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a different dimension. A Commission relieved of adjudicative functions and
concentrating on regulation and enforcement would be best equipped to handle
such matters.
C. PraceduralRules
If Congress were to remove the adjudicative functions from the Commission,
the new administrative court could adopt fair rules of procedure consistent with
those in effect in the federal courts. In the meantime, the recommendations of
the Enforcement Advisory Committee should be implemented immediately in the
interest of fairness, equity, and due process. Recommendation number 23 urges
that the identity of witnesses and legal theories be made available at the request
of a respondent; number 25 suggests emphasizing the opportunity for settlement
or simplification of the issues at the prehearing stage of a proceeding. The
modifications of the Commission's rules recommended by the Committee would
aid in expediting the presently "unduly protracted" proceedings, in addition to
adding the elements of fairness mentioned above. 9 None of the changes recommended by the Committee require legislation.
The Commission has not yet moved to effectuate the changes recommended. Their validity, importance and need would be appreciated by the
members of the Commission if one or more Commissioners would undertake to
sit as an administrative law judge or at least observe the conduct of administrative proceedings. This author is convinced that the members of the Commission
would be persuaded of the need for the changes recommended by the Enforcement Advisory Committee and for additional changes not mentioned in the
Report, which would insure a greater degree of fairness in the trial of administrative proceedings and expedite them as well.
D. Enforcement and Professional Responsibility
The Commission is entitled to expect that professionals who practice before
it, such as lawyers, accountants, engineers and geologists, should maintain high
standards of ethics and professional conduct. To this end, the Commission has
recently instituted court proceedings in which it has named lawyers and accountants as defendants.9 0 This author has urged the need for study of such
litigation and a definition of the role of attorneys in representing public companies, and otherwise practicing before the Commission."- Rules of professional
conduct should not be developed through case-by-case litigation, but rather
59 Id. at 37-43.
60 No purpose is served by listing the names of cases and the courts wherein they have
been initiated. See discussion in the ENFORCEMENT POLICIES REPORT, supra note 9, at 9, 10
(consultation between the Commission and professional associations is recommended).
61 SEC. REo. & LAw RP. No. 182, at A-2 (Dec. 20, 1972):
The SEC has challenged the traditional role of lawyers as advocates, and has been
doing so on a case-by-case basis in the courts. Presumably, it will also do so in SEC
disciplinary proceedings. Lawyers' responsibilities should not be defined in this
manner and the Bar should participate in establishing standards and negotiating with
the Commission to effect reasonable safe-guards for clients and for the public. The
challenge to the traditional, confidential lawyer-client relationship calls for the Bar
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through reasoned discussion in the public interest. Lawyers have long maintained
rules of professional responsibility and the courts have enforced compliance with
such standards since lawyers are officers of the courts. Other professions are
capable of doing likewise. The Commission's unilaterally seeking to establish its
ideas or concepts of professional responsibility, or those of its staff, through
litigation rather than bilaterally with the various professions does not merit commendation, but requires change. As with its failure to change its procedural
rules to invest its administrative trial procedures with a needed tone of fairness,
the Commission as an institution likewise has not moved expeditiously in the
public interest to formulate standards of professional conduct. It would be well
if the Commission would modify its posture from "headhunter"6 2 to regulator,
in the sense that it looks for compliance with established standards.
E. Regulation
Over the past 40 years, the SEC conclusively demonstrated its lack of
capacity to apply a rule of reason to the regulatory reach of the securities laws.
Particularly, following the Supreme Court's recognition that the securities laws
were remedial legislation to be liberally construed, and exemptions therefrom
to be strictly construed, " the Commission has been unable to resist seeking more
and more power. It must, of course, be acknowledged that the courts have supported the Commission's extensions of the perimeters of its jurisdiction. Thus,
only restudy and reevaluation by Congress, followed by legislative action, will
result in a change in the course which the Commission has long pursued. It is
time for Congress to reassess the priorities. To date the Commission has not well
established its priorities-witness its inability to take effective steps to blunt or
cushion the adverse effects of market gyrations while it exhausted and thinly
spread its available personnel by expanding the fields which it regulates. Concededly, the SEC under former Chairman Casey made great strides in bringing
order to many interpretive areas previously obscured. Despite such dynamic
progress over a two-year period, reassessment is still critically imperative. There
are numerous spheres of regulatory importance to which a congressional evaluation of Commission action is long overdue.
1. SMALL ISSUES

Aside from the recommendations already noted64 which would involve
to take steps to define the lawyers' professional responsibilities. If it is left to a litigated case-by-case development of standards, the public and the Bar will be prejudiced.

Id.

62 The use of the term does not invite the rejoinder that the professions are acting like
"cannibals." Lawyers who engage in an enforcement practice befor& the Commission can
attest to the fact that the mention by a witness of a conversation with a lawyer or accountant
brings a new alertness to the questioner and a new "snap" to his questions. The atmosphere
becomes electrified, and may even bring a branch chief or assistant director into the room.
Pursuit of the lawyer or accountant seems to become a more compelling objective than the
matter under investigation. It is an atmosphere in need of change.
63 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
64 See text accompanying note 30, supra.
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a major shift in public policy in administering the provisions of Regulation A,"
adopted pursuant to section 3 (b) of the 1933 Act," the Wheat Report recognized
in 1969 that some rigid restrictions had developed and urged that they be
changed. 7 More unfortunate is the fact that a Regulation A filing is so encumbered with requirements similar to those in a registration statement that
underwriters and lawyers in the country's financial centers are loathe to use
Regulation A. It has long ceased to be an effective tool for use in small business
financing. A reversal of an attitude stimulated by congressional oversight is
overdue.
2.

INTRASTATE OFFERINGS

Despite the clear statements of public policy set forth in sections 3 (a) (11 6$
and 1869 of the 1933 Act respecting the intrastate exemption, the Commission
and its staff have been chipping away at the exemption over the years.7" The
congressional policy was stated as intending to exempt ".

.

. sales within a state

of the entire issues of local issuers."'" The Commission has announced proposed
Rule 147" which deals with the intrastate exemption and encrusts additional
restrictions on the exemption by setting a six-month blanket to cover sales of all
securities, defining doing business to require that 80 per cent of gross revenues
come from the one state along with there being 80 per cent of assets within the
state, requiring that 90 per cent of the proceeds also be used in the state, and
restricting resales to nonresidents for 12 months. These are arbitrary and artificial limitations on the intrastate exemption and are further extensions of a trend
to ignore and restrict the announced public policy set forth in the exemption.
Again there is need for Congress to revisit and reevaluate public policy.
This author has reviewed this exemption heretofore' and pointed out pitfalls
in the use of the exemption, but he is not in sympathy with the concept that
clarification and more certainty require restrictions on a statutory exemption.
3.

COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT

The insurance industry first intruded into the SEC's securities domain with
the so-called variable annuity which the Commission successfully contended
was not truly an insurance product, but a security. 4 An attempt to exclude a
65 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 et seq. (1972).
66 15 U.S.C. § 77c'(b) (1971).
67 WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 13-15.
68 15 U.S.C. § 77c (a)(11) (1971).
69 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1971).
70 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961). The Commission mentions ...
local financing by local industries. . ." and repeats its warning (as in Release No. 4386) that
". .. quick commencement of trading and prompt resale of portions of the issue to nonresidents . . ." may defeat the exemption. Id.
71 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933).
72 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5349 (Jan. 8, 1973).
73 McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions Under the Federal Securities Act, 107
U. PENN. L. Ray. 937 (1959).
74 SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v.
SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
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variable insurance product with guarantees from being held to be a security failed
again. 5 The insurance industry's most recent attempt to develop a variable
product which would be exempt from securities regulation involved variable life
insurance. The SEC concluded that the product was subject to the 1933 and
1934 Acts, but granted tentative exemptions for variable life insurance from the
Investment Company Act of 1940.6 With autocratic chutzpah the Commission
announced to the states the types of actions it expects them to take in regulating
variable life insurance and promised:
The Commission will closely monitor the development of state law in this
area to assure its adequacy in providing these protections and, if in the future
it appears that substantial deficiencies exist and are not likely to be remedied,
the Commission will then consider whether it is necessary or appropriate to
modify or rescind Rule 3c-4.7

This author was on both the SEC and the industry sides of the variable annuity cases as counsel and believes that the following comments are made with
objectivity. The Commission unfortunately was unable to resist extending the
reach of its regulatory powers and was not content to leave the control of variable products issued by insurance companies with the insurance departments of
the states. This grasp for power burdens the Commission's personnel and causes
the available personnel to be spread thinly, regulating an already regulated industry, while some, including the writer, question how well (or even adequately)
the SEC is performing its main mission-the protection of public investors and
policing the markets. In SEC u. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., the Supreme Court
left open the issue of application of the 1940 Act,70 but in the statement quoted
above the SEC leaves no doubt of its intention to oversee the actions of the state
insurance commissioners. One necessarily must wonder how long Congress will
allow this situation to continue without giving clear guidance to the Commission
and the states, and declaring the federal public policy once and for all.
4.

RiEAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS

In October, 1972, the Commission's Real Estate Advisory Committee issued
its report, which contains a sufficient number of controversial recommendations
to keep attorneys in the securities and real estate fields busy for a long time.
Naturally, since it is a SEC-appointed committee, this report looks upon syndicates, partnerships, limited partnerships and condominiums through glasses
75
76
77

SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-l-a-52 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1940 Act].
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5360 (Jan. 31, 1973) (adopting Rule 3c-4 under the

1940 Act. See also SEC. REG. & LAW Ra,. No. 187, at AA 1-2, G1-6 (Jan. 31, 1973).
The billion dollar Equity Funding insurance and securities scandal will afford state insurance regulators and federal and state securities regulators much opportunity to study and
correct the weaknesses in the regulation of both insurance and securities. Nothing which has
been reported to date supports the theory that the SEC would be more competent than state
insurance departments to regulate and prevent fraud in the insurance industry. Inspection and
regulatory techniques of securities and insurance regulatory agencies have failed and require
change.
78 387 U.S. 202, 212 (1967).
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tinted by an emphasis on securities law. At the same time several states are
already in, or are moving into, the "regulation act." This is another example of
a situation requiring congressional review. There is a need for definition as to
whether the public should be protected by a federal agency regulating securities
or one regulating land. Further, Congress is better able to define public policy
considerations involved between the states and the federal government, or between the states.
5.

INTERPRETIVE CHANGES EXPAND COMMISSION WORKLOAD

The long-overdue and eagerly awaited clarification by Rule 144"° of the
terms and conditions under which investment stock may be sold and the rescinding of merger Rule 133,80 through the adoption of Rule 145,1 continue to impose added workloads to an already burdened staff. There should be an administrative solution to the continuing need for volumes of no-action letters under
Rule 144. Such requests and the added registration burdens under Rule 145
cause one to wonder if the Commission really carefully considers the effects of
the new burdens on staff which will result and whether the public interest is
really advanced by a new Rule such as 145.2
Those who follow the interpretive development in the securities field are
inundated by the exhausting proliferation of "no-action" letters.' In principle
the no-action letter has been a great aid to the industry and the bar, but there
tends to develop an attitude of nit-picking by both the inquirers and the staff.
Much unnecessary personnel time is thus wasted which could be eliminated by
clearer rules and guidelines. Time saved could be devoted to more critical problems for the protection of investors.
These matters are in need of administrative review. Legislation is not
necessary to accomplish a more effective utilization of the available personnel.
Perhaps more concentrated review by the Commission of positions taken by the
staff would aid in the development of new rules and guidelines. The better
appreciation the Commission has of staff problems the better the possibility of
solving them. The legal profession can help by using opinions of counsel and
relying on them. The need for a "security blanket" in the form of a "no-action"
letter should be discouraged by the Commission, the industry and the bar.
VI. Conclusion
After 40 years of experience in the administration of the federal securities
laws there is a need for restudy and reevaluation by Congress and the Commis79 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) (effective April 15, 1972).
80 SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1972).
81 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972) (effective Jan. 1, 1973).
82 The no-sale theory had been a part of the securities lore (or law) for so long one tends
to feel that an old friend passed away. A respectable segment of the bar and the industry
favored retention of a modified Rule 133 rather than the Rule 145 registration requirements.
83 For an excellent review of the "no-action" letter procedure see Lowenfels, SEC "'NoAction" Letters: Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLum. L. RaV. 1256 (1971).
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sion as well. Some of the areas which should be revisited promptly and the
questions to be raised are:
1. Does the full disclosure policy of the 1933 Act adequately protect
investors?
2. Should not unseasoned companies and idea companies be limited
in the amount of money they are initially permitted to raise publicly and
the type of investors to whom such companies may make offerings?
3. Does not fairness require the public to receive a more equitable
share of the ownership of a company by restricting "cheap stock" and
setting standards to minimize dilution?
4. Does public investment merit participation in management by the
public?
5. Should not the distribution of securities to the public be done more
fairly, perhaps by allotment?
6. Are not "new-issue" markets in need of effective controls to eliminate artificial, manipulative, depressing factors such as short-selling of
"cold issues" and to avoid the runaway markets of "hot issues"?
7. While enforcement has a necessary, proper place in the administration of the securities laws, should not regulation be more effectively
used in the public interest?
8. Is there not a need for the Commission to assert leadership in the
establishment of enforcement and regulatory policies?
9. Should the Commission be relieved of its adjudicative functions an4
be free to concentrate on enforcement, regulation and administration of
the securities laws?
10. Is not an independent, separate administrative court a better system of jurisprudence than the present adjudicative procedures which
involve the Commission at the same time as prosecutor, judge and jury?
11. Does not the protection of investors call for congressional direction
to the Commission to fulfill the main mission of the securities laws and
for Congress to return to the states the regulation of insurance companies and their products and to other agencies the regulation of real
estate companies and their financing vehicles?
This author, by raising these questions, does not imply that the Commission
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and its staff are inept, bumbling, or incompetent. On the contrary, as Dean
Landis pointed out, the Commission's staff is extremely well qualified and devoted. Rather, the questions raised are directed toward policy and administration of policy.
The concept of controls on companies going public is apt to evoke unfavorable reaction. However, should not there be study? Are we assured that the full
disclosure system cannot be improved? Should there really be no limitations on
unseasoned companies going to the public for financing? On the other hand, this
author is confident that most will agree that investor protection requires more
effective controls over distributions of securities and over the marketplace.

